Questioning the Question of Questions

by R. Jonah Steinmetz

The Permissibility and Purpose of the Tzadik v’Ra Lo Query

I. INTRODUCTION

The mysterious problem of evil in the world is a perpetual one.^[1]The use of the word “perpetual” here is intended bidirectionally. The problem of evil exists from time immemorial and may persist for all eternity. Though we are promised a clearer, more holistic … Continue reading Judaism struggles ceaselessly with the enigmatic incongruity of the tzadik v’ra lo phenomenon.^[2]The parallel opposite phenomenon of rasha v’tov lo is equally incongruous and, in some ways, even more prevalent. This question is dealt with in tandem with its abovementioned counterpart … Continue reading Why do the righteous undergo such cruel suffering? How can a benevolent God allow for the existence of wickedness? What justice lies in punishment of the innocent? Jewish thinkers throughout the ages have grappled with theodicy, the “Question of Questions.”

Though, in every instance, the answer is at best incomplete, many titans of philosophy have presented thoughtful theories. Ramban authored a fundamental essay on this topic, included in the “Shaar HaGemul” section of his greater work, “Toras HaAdam.” There, he suggests an organized model, culling from and juxtaposing many statements of Chazal to form a comprehensive approach to this perennial issue. Though Ramban admits to the impossibility of complete comprehension (or, “the Answer of Answers”), he does present an approach which addresses many of the relevant considerations.

A thorough analysis probing the depths of Ramban’s treatise is beyond the scope of my capabilities. However, this essay will culminate with a condensed summary and overview of his approach in the hopes of making a dense medieval work more accessible to the reader.^[3]Of course, the obligation then devolves upon the reader to utilize this mere overview in subsequently studying Ramban’s work carefully, armed with a basic familiarity with the terms and concepts … Continue reading In advance of said overview, I will put forth two insights related to the study of this topic, namely: what license do we have to probe these intellectual depths; and what purpose is there in studying an incomprehensible subject?

II. QUESTIONING THE QUESTION OF QUESTIONS

R. Soloveitchik’s Rejection of “Why”

Before engaging in the enduring question of “why,” we must note R. Yosef Dov Soloveitchik’s famous dismissal of this question. In his timely, timeless essay, Kol Dodi Dofek, R. Soloveitchik presents the problem of tzadik v’ra lo and proceeds to explain why investigation thereof is as inappropriate as it is ineffective.

Judaism determined that man, entrapped in the depths of a frozen, fate-laden existence, will seek in vain for the solution to the problem of evil within the framework of speculative thought, for he will never find it… Finite man, with his partial vision, cannot uncover the absolute good in the cosmos… In a word, the “I” of fate asks a theoretical-metaphysical question regarding evil, and this question has no answer. It is insoluble.

In the second dimension of human existence, destiny, the problem of suffering assumes a new form… The man of destiny is highly realistic and does not flinch from confronting evil face to face… His approach is an ethico-halakhic one, devoid of the slightest speculative-metaphysical coloration. When the man of destiny suffers he says to himself: “Evil exists, and I will neither deny it nor camouflage it… I am concerned about evil from a halakhic standpoint, like a person who wishes to know the deed which he shall do; I ask one simple question: What must the sufferer do so that he may live through his suffering?” In this dimension, the center of gravity shifts from the causal and teleological aspect of evil… to its practical aspect… The fundamental question is: What obligation does suffering impose upon man?… We do not inquire about the hidden ways of the Almighty, but, rather, about the path wherein man shall walk when suffering strikes. We ask neither about the cause of evil nor about its purpose, but, rather, about how it might be mended and elevated. How shall a person act in a time of trouble? What ought a man to do so that he not perish in his afflictions?^[4]Quotations in this essay are from the English translation of Kol Dodi Dofek, Fate and Destiny (Ktav Publishing House, 2000). The above excerpt is found there (pp. 5-8).

R. Soloveitchik expresses emphatic disdain for the question of “why,” favoring instead the question of “for what.” The innocent victim upon whom seemingly unbefitting suffering is visited is better served by deep introspection and self-examination in the hopes of identifying a character flaw which the divinely ordained miseries might motivate him to improve upon. In so asking, the victim transforms himself from “subject” to “object,” from “man of fate” to “man of destiny” – actively repurposing his afflictions as tools for his spiritual improvement.

This is the underlying theme throughout Sefer Iyov. Iyov is rebuked by God for asking “why,” until he eventually receives the message and pivots to the question of “for what.”

Consider: This was precisely the answer that the Creator gave to Job. As long as Job philosophized, like a slave of fate, regarding the cause of and reason for suffering, as long as he demanded of God that He reveal to him the nature of evil, as long as he continued to question and complain, asking why and wherefore afflictions befall man, God answered him forcefully and caustically, posing to him the very powerful and pointed question, “Dost though know?”… However, once Job understood how strange and inappropriate his question was, how great was his ignorance… the Almighty revealed to him the true principle contained in suffering… [Y]ou will never understand the secret of “why,” you will never comprehend the cause or telos of suffering. But there is one thing that you are obliged to know: the principle of mending one’s afflictions. If you can elevate yourself via your afflictions… then know full well that these inflections were intended as a means for mending both your soul and your spirit.^[5]Fate and Destiny, pp. 11-12

The Precedent for “Why”

Compelling and inspiring as his thesis may be, Rav Soloveitchik’s contention seems to be at odds with many millennia of Jewish philosophy. Rambam dealt with the question of evil at length. Ramban, as noted, toiled to systematically address the issue. In truth, prophet after prophet seems to have asked the burning question of “why,” perhaps none more prominently than the prophet of prophets, Moshe Rabeinu. In the immediate aftermath of the cheit ha’egel, Moshe pleads with God:

And now, if I have indeed found favor in Your eyes, make Your way known to me, so that I may comprehend You, so that I may find favor in Your eyes; and see that this nation is Your people… He said, “Show me Your glory.” He said, “I shall make My goodness pass before you… I shall show favor when I choose to show favor, and I shall show mercy when I choose to show mercy.”^[6]Shemos 33:13-19

The Gemara (Berachos 7a) elucidates that this encounter was a conversation about the Question of Questions. R. Yochanan says in the name of R. Yossi that Moshe requested that God reveal His ways to him and that God, in fact, acquiesced:

אמר לפניו: רבונו של עולם! מפני מה יש צדיק וטוב לו ויש צדיק ורע לו, יש רשע וטוב לו ויש רשע ורע לו? אמר לו: משה, צדיק וטוב לו – צדיק בן צדיק, צדיק ורע לו – צדיק בן רשע, רשע וטוב לו – רשע בן צדיק, רשע ורע לו – רשע בן רשע

Moshe begs God to reveal to him the mystery of the seemingly incongruous system of reward and punishment in this world. Why do some righteous individuals experience good, while others suffer? Why are some wicked people tortured, while others prosper? ^[7]Fascinatingly, Moshe Rabeinu does not only ask about tzadik v’ra lo and rasha v’tov lo. Rather, he inquires as to each and every permutation, including the righteous who are rewarded and the evil … Continue reading And Moshe was not the last to question divine providence in this manner. Ramban lists no less than four subsequent prophets who grappled with the matter: Yirmiyahu (12:1), David HaMelech (Tehillim 73:13), Yeshayahu (63:17), and Chabakuk (1:3-4).^[8]Shaar HaGemul, #68-71 (Chazon Yoel [Sperka] edition). Ramban notes that Iyov, himself a prophet, engages in an extended dialogue about this problem with his contemporaries, as recorded at length in … Continue reading

Does not the historical fact that many prophets posed the Question of Questions run counter to R. Soloveitchik’s vigorous rejection of the validity of the query?

Resolving the Tension: Judaism’s Dichotomous Reaction to Suffering

In truth, R. Soloveitchik’s seeming attack on theodicy is characteristically nuanced, in no way denying a tradition of the philosophical study of this subject. To explain, we must pivot momentarily to a related question.

In the course of his remarks, R. Soloveitchik points to a common intellectual trend in the philosophical quest of the sufferer, summarily discarding it as unsuitable for the Jewish approach.

After the psychic upheaval of the sufferer as the immediate reaction to evil has passed, there follows an intellectual curiosity which endeavors to understand the cosmos and thereby undergird man’s confidence and security… He tracks the intellectual foundations of suffering and evil, and seeks to find harmony and balance… and to blunt the sharp edge of the tension between the thesis – the good – and the antithesis – the bad – in existence… [H]e formulates a metaphysics of evil wherewith he is able to reach an accommodation with evil, indeed to cover it up. The sufferer utilizes his capacity for intellectual abstraction, with which he was endowed by his Creator, to the point of self-deception – the denial of the existence of evil in the world.

Judaism, with its realistic approach to man and his place in the world, understood that evil cannot be blurred or camouflaged and that any attempt to downplay the extent of the contradiction and fragmentation to be found in reality will neither endow man with tranquility nor enable him to grasp the existential mystery.^[9]Fate and Destiny, p. 4

While these words pose no inherent problem, the viewpoint which R. Soloveitchik seems to be rejecting belongs to none other than Rambam himself.

You know that he who removes the obstacle of motion is to some extent the cause of the motion… in this sense we say of him who removed a certain property that he produced the absence of that property, although absence of a property is nothing positive. Just as we say of him who puts out the light at night that he has produced darkness, so we say of him who destroyed the sight of any being that he produced blindness, although darkness and blindness are negative properties, and require no agent. In accordance with this view we explain the following passage of Isaiah: “I form the light and create (boreh) darkness: I make peace, and create (boreh) evil” (Isa. 45:7), for darkness and evil are non-existing things. Consider that the prophet does not say, I make (oseh) darkness, I make (oseh) evil, because darkness and evil are not things in positive existence to which the verb “to make” would apply.^[10]Moreh Nevuchim 3:10, trans. Friedlander, 1903

According to Rambam, there is no reality of evil. Rather, what we perceive as evil is simply the privation of good. Much like darkness is defined as the absence of light, perceived ra is simply the absence of tov; suffering, the lack of blessing. Could it be that R. Soloveitchik was dismissing out of hand the philosophical stance of his great hero, Rambam, in these few lines?

On many occasions, my rebbe, R. Mayer Twersky, explained that this is certainly not the case. R. Soloveitchik can wholeheartedly embrace Rambam’s argument for the nullification of suffering, while simultaneously advancing his prescription for acknowledging and engaging with an extant evil. The question is one of perspective.

There is certainly a place for theodicy in the study halls and classrooms of Jewish thought. In that setting and from that angle, one can posit theories which quash evil, relegating it to the world of imagined perceptions, inaccurate and incomplete in the grand scheme. God is wholly good. His world is entirely tov. Any evil which is experienced is a human misperception stemming from a deficient view of world history.

This, however, is only true in the realm of philosophy. The question of “why” has its place in the philosopher’s classroom, as well as in the machshavah works of Rishonim and contemporary thinkers alike. But when we enter the plane of human experience, when we encounter evil as it is perceived by living, breathing people, the question of “why” is no longer appropriate. In fact, on the experiential plane, the question of “why” is not even accurate. Here, R. Soloveitchik explains, the question mark on the existence of evil is removed and replaced with an exclamation point. The suffering certainly exists; painfully so. The only thing one ought to wonder is, “for what?” What message is being sent? Where must the victim improve and progress, using this tragedy as his motivation?

This clarification is crucial in our initial quandary, as well. We noted that R. Soloveitchik’s approach seems to fly in the face of a hallowed tradition of asking “why.” Ostensibly, he spurned what the prophets and philosophers of old embraced. However, upon further consideration, we realize there is no inconsistency at all. Moshe, the prophets, Ramban, Rambam, and so many great Jewish minds throughout the generations were grappling with theodicy in their intellectual writings and lecture halls. They were theorizing and philosophizing purely in the realm of intellectual academia, divorced of any connection to reality.

R. Soloveitchik does not criticize this intellectual pursuit. He merely notes that the question becomes moot, nay, unacceptable when applied in the realm of human experience. When living, breathing people endure hardships, their quest cannot be to solve the insolvable. Rather, they must seek out the cure, the spiritual mend which their divinely ordained suffering is intended to inspire. When sitting in the study halls of Jewish thought, we may ask “why.” But when standing in the hospital corridor, processing depressingly tragic news of some cruel affliction, the question of “why” is rendered inapplicable and inappropriate. When man faces the reality – as opposed to the theory – of evil in this world, he must engage with it, learn from it, and repurpose it for growth. Outward probing is frowned upon. Inward reflection is lauded.^[11]After developing this perspective, I discovered that R. Soloveitchik himself explicated and elaborated upon this sharp, nuanced distinction, encouraging both the philosophical pursuit and the … Continue reading

Precedent for this Distinction in Shaar HaGemul

Amazingly, Ramban himself appears to have drawn this very distinction between theory and practice, philosophy and reality.

וענין השאלה הזאת לא תקטן בהיות נכשליה מועטין, ולא תגדל בהיותם רבים, כי לא לאדם שיחנו, שנזכה מעשיו בהיות רובם טובים ולא שגה ולא טעה אלא במועט, אין טענותינו אלא על הצור תמים פעלו כי כל דרכיו משפט אין בהם נפתל ועקש

The significance of this query (i.e. – tzadik v’ra lo) is neither diminished by the scarcity of its victims, nor is it magnified should [its victims] be numerous. For our discussion [revolves] not around [any given] man, that he should merit if the majority of his actions are good and he made very few mistakes. Our inquiry is only regarding the Rock, perfect in His ways (i.e. – the benevolent God), since all His ways are just, devoid of any twisting or perversion.^[12]Shaar HaGemul, #132, translation my own.

Here, Ramban emphasizes that the quest for comprehending evil within the framework of divine providence is by no means an attempt to solve the problem on the plane of human experience. An increase in cases of tzadik v’ra lo would not intensify the question; a decrease thereof would not reduce its import. The question is not on the experiences of any given individual. Rather, it is a study of hashgachah, an endless search for a deeper understanding of God’s mysterious ways.

Manifestation and Reflection of the Dichotomy in Tanach and Chazal

This distinction – now seen in the writing of R. Soloveitchik as well as Ramban – is perhaps most clearly manifest in God’s reaction to various attempts at theodicy by the prophets. When Moshe Rabeinu requests an answer to the Question of Questions, his request may or may not have been granted, but he certainly was not rebuked for asking.^[13]See Gemara Brachos 7a for two opinions as to whether God heeded his request. We will, God willing, return to this later. Yirmiyahu, David, Yeshayahu, and Chabakuk were likewise not admonished for seeking a solution to the age-old enigma of tzadik v’ra lo.

It is only Iyov who is reprimanded for his line of questioning. Why? Did not Iyov make the very same inquiry of God as Moshe and the subsequent prophets? Why the harsh response to his attempt at uncovering a metaphysic of suffering? The answer, now, is obvious. Moshe asked about the idea of evil. The other prophets, too, focused not on any given individual’s suffering, but rather on the concept of tzadik v’ra lo. This is an appropriate, even encouraged pursuit of philosophical truth. It is only Iyov who asked about the human experience of evil. Iyov was not philosophizing about the existence of suffering in the thematic sense. Rather, Iyov was asking “why” on the human plane, when confronting real, raw evil. On this level, the question is never “why,” the question is only “for what.”

Case in point: Tradition has it that Moshe Rabeinu himself poses the identical question to God yet again when he witnesses Rebbe Akiva suffering a painful martyr’s death.

חזר לאחוריו, ראה ששוקלין בשרו במקולין, אמר לפניו: רבש”ע, זו תורה וזו שכרה? א”ל: שתוק, כך עלה במחשבה לפני. ^[14]Gemara Menachos 29b

Moshe Rabeinu sees Rebbe Akiva’s flesh being flayed by the enemy and he cries out, “Ribono Shel Olam, is this the reward he receives for his great devotion and mastery of Torah? Why would such evil befall such a righteous person?!” Here, God does not entertain the question. In fact, He does not even tolerate the question. “Silence! This is My divine plan! You have no understanding. You are not privy to My thoughts and intentions. Do not attempt to understand the mystery of tzadik v’ra lo.”

When Moshe asked God to “show me Your way,” God tolerated the question. He may even have acquiesced. When Moshe inquired as to the philosophical system – the inquiry was warranted. But when the very same Moshe asked the very same question of “why” about a particular human experience, he was rebuked and shut down. Here, the question of “why” is misplaced. Theodicy belongs in the study hall. When one enters the realm of human experience, in which the cold reality of evil is not denied but engaged, the “why” question may no longer be posed. In such situations, topical Halakhah steps in, prodding the sufferer and the onlooker to seek out practical, active responses to the great motivator, evil.

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